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Suppose that each creditor bank to a particular debtor country is
confronted with a choice: each dollar of country debt held can
be either rescheduled or sold at a given price. What choice will
they make? Relatively strong banks will  take advantage  of a debt
workout to exit from the debt. Relatively weak banks will relend.
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Demirguc-Kunt and Diwan explore what deter-  Brazil rescheduling deal, the first package
mines tne choice banks will make when con-  specifically based on the menu approach to debt
fronted with a "menu" of exit instruments and  workouts. Their empirical results statistically
new-money options, as is now typical in debt  link commercial banks' characteristics to their
workouts for developing countries.  portfolio choices  - with 83 percent predictabil-
ity in this sample.
In particular, they examine how deposit
insurance and rules on capital adequacy affect a  Among the implications for the new debt
commercial bank's exit decision - arguing that  reduction strategy:
these exit decisions arc influenced rnainly by the
structure of the banks' balance sheets and by the  *  Larger debt reductions negotiated on a
regulatory systems within which they operate.  market basis are more costly, per unit of debt
reduced. To increase debt reduction, weaker
The FDIC insurance subsidy is more valu-  banks must be persuaded to exit, increasing the
able to weak institutions, they argue, so a bank's  needed exit price.
valuation of the debt claims it holds is inverseiy
related to the bank's financial strength. For a  * The exit price depends on the strength of the
given menu, the relatively weak banks choose to  banking industry.  So the effectiveness (and cost)
relend.  of the present debt strategy is affected by
changes in the world economy.  In boom periods,
The banks that choose to exit are those that  banks are stronger and exit prices reduced.
are financially "strong" and have relatively high
exposure to the country whose debt is being  *  Regulators can affect the cost of debt
recontracted.  Contrary to common belief, bank  reduction by altering the regulatory framework
size alone does not significantly affect exit  within which the banks operate.
behavior.
*  )cbt reduction in the developing countries
Demirguc-Kunt and Diwan test their results  is beneficial to the deposit insurance agencies of
using individual banks' choices in the 1988  the major creditor nations.
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Reductions of the stock of debt and its service are now at the core
of the strategy to bring the debt crisis to an end. Recognizing that reduced
cohesion between the banks would not allow the concerted lending strategy to
go forward, the new approach seeks financing for debt reduction from the
International Financial Institutions  while emphasizing the need for voluntary
choices among banks between a variety of financial options. Accordingly,
recent financing packages (Brazil  1988, Mexico 1989, Philippines 1990, Costa-
Rica 1990, Venezuela 1990) have offered a menu of financial instruments-
including exit and relending options- from  which individual  tanks could
freely choose according to their  best interest.  1 Financing packages prepared
following this approach are based on a recognition of the diversity of
comnercial banks' incentives  and constraints.
An important issue that arises in this context is the determination
of  banks' characteristics that can explain their choice when presented with
a menu of options. In this paper, we address this issue  using both
theoretical  arguments and an empirical assessment of the Brazil 1988
rescheduling deal--the first package specifically  based on the menu approach
to debt workouts. Our empirical results link statistically commercial banks'
characteristics to their choice of elements of a financing menu.
Absent regulatory and tax considerations and with risk neutrality,
the banks' decision rule would be simple. Each bank would choose from the
manu the option that is perceived to  have the greatest present value. This is
the case made by Williamson (1988)  and Cline (1989)  who clai. that
differences in expectations  between optimist and pessimist banks represent
the major distinction between banks that exit and banks that relend. This
view however fails to explain why the optimists do not directly buy out the
1However, the relative pricing of the  menu items  has remained a concerted
exercise.-2-
pessimists.
In this  paper,  we argue  that  the  exit  decision  of commercial  banks  is
mainly  influenced  by the  structure  of their  balance  sheet  and  by the
regulatory  system  within  which  they  operate.  It is  well  known  that  mispriced
deposit  insurance  (and  the  safety  net  in  general)  subsidizes  risk-taking
behavior  by banks--especially  once  a bank's  financial  position  deteriorates
(for  example,  see  Merton  [1977],  Sharpe  [1978],  and  Kane [1985]).  Bank  can
increase  their  value  by taking  on  more  risk.  They  can  achieve  this  by
increasing  either  asset  risk  or leverage.  We focus  on the  latter.  While
leverage  is limited  by capital  adequacy  requirements,  the  book  value
application  of those  requirements  creates  extra  value  for  claims  whose  real
value  has  fallen  below  book  value.  In  effect,  the  ownership  of such  claims
allows  banks  to  over-represent  their  own  capital,  thus  increasing  their
(real)  leverage.  As a result,  banks  that  sell  inherited  debt  that  is treated
at  par  by regulators  lose  valuable  rights  to  excess  leverage.  In our  view,
real  leverage  is determined  by  history,  with  random  shocks  imposing  losses  on
certain  assets  and  providing  at the  same  time  their  holders  with  rights  to
"excess  leverage",  a non  tradable  asset.  Since  the  FDIC  insurance  subsidy
(and  thus  excess  leverage)  is  more  valuable  to  weak  institutions,  a  bank's
valuation  of these  "excess  leverage"  rights  is inversely  related  to the
bank's  financial  strength.  This  allows  us to  show  that  a given  menu separates
banks  into  two  groups,  with  the  relatively  strong  banks  exiting,  and the
relatively  weak  banks  relending.
Other  studies  have focused  on the  effect  of the  regulatory  framework
on the  incentives  of  banks  to  increase  asset  risk  rather  than  leverage.  The
important  distinction  between  those  analyses  and  ours  lies  in  the  assumptions
about  the  characteristics  of assets  other  than  country  debt  that  can  be
acquired  by banks.  For  example,  Sachs  (1989)  draws  a distinction  between  the-3-
incentives  of small  and  large  banks.  He argues  that  since  that  large
institutions  are  subject  to  preferential  treatment  by regulators  which  leads
them  to take  additional  risks  (see  Kane [1985,  1989]  and  Kaufman  [1985]),
they  pr4ier  relending  over  exit  relative  to smaller  banks.  Huizinga  and  Ozler
(1990)  distinguish  between  small  and  large  debtor  countries.  They  argue  that
insured  banks  bid  up the  price  of assets  that  significantly  affect  their
probability  of failure.  As a result,  the  secondary  market  price  of a lar&e
country'  debt  is  larger  than  that  of  an otherwise  similar,  but  smaller:
country.
These  arguments  rely  on the  assumption  that  the  riskiness  of dabt
claims  cannot  be duplicated  by other  assets  in the  market-place.  When  banks
can  also  increase  risk  by  acquiring  substitute  assets  rather  than  by
increasing  their  country  debt  exposure,  banks'  size  cannot  explain  menu
choices.  Moreover,  for  the  actions  of  particular  banks  to  have  an effect  on
the  price  of particular  risk  dimensions,  monopoly  power  over  certain  risk
dimensions  has  to  be assumed.  Given  the  small  overall  size  of regulated  banks
in  the  global  financial  markets,  this  is  however  not  a  particularly  appealing
hypothesis.  This  view  would  also imply  that  each  bank  should  specialize  in a
certain  risk  dimension,  which  we do  not  observe.  Finally,  our  empirical
investigation  rejects  the  hypotheses  according  to  which  exposure  (and  bank
size)  are  negatively  correlated  to  exit.
In  contrast,  our  analysis  neutralizes  banks'  incentives  to increase
asset  risk (by  assuming  that  all  the  securities  that  can  be held in  banks'
portfolios  are  part  of the  same  risk-class)  and  focuses  instead  on changes  in
real  leverage.2  Our  main  argument  is close  to  those  of Sachs  and  Huizinga
2Another  reason  for  neutralizing  the  intensity  of risk  per  unit  of asset  in
the  analysis  is  that  the  issue  about  whether  asset  risk  and  leverage  a;-
substitutes  or complementary  for  banks  (i.e,  whether  the  marginal  valu.  of
leverage  increases  or  decreases  with  asset  risk)  is  unresolved  in  the  banking
literature  (for  both sides  of the  debate,  see  Keeley  and  Furlong  [1988]  and-4-
(1987)  and Bouchet and Hay (1989)  who discuss the consequences of book value
accounting on exit incentives.  They argue that the large  money center banks
resist exit because debt reduction requires book losses that are costly given
their large exposure and weak financial  position. We make those statements
precise by building a model that characterizes these exit costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we build
a model of bank choice behavior that incorporazes  deposit insurance and
capital adequacy considerations, and we derive our main results. We describe
the Brazil 1988 agreement in section 3 and test our hypotheses about the
determinants of bank choices in section  4. The important implications of our
results are discussed in section 5.
2.  The  Commercial  Banks'  Decision-Making  Framework
Suppose that each creditor bank to a particular debtor country is
confronted  with two options: each dollar of country debt held can be either
rescheduled, or sold at a given price. Our goal in this section is to explore
the determinants of this choice. To do so,  we develop a simple model of
banks' optimal behavior under risk neutrality, focusing on the interaction
between mispriced deposit insurance and the  book value application of capital
adequacy requirements. The model shows that  banks with weaker balance sheets
and small country exposures tend to prefer relending over exit compared to
stronger and to more exposed banks.
2.1  A  Simple  Model
Consider a simple two periods model of risk neutral banks. Banks
differ in the composition of their portfolio of assets. There are N assets
(types  of loans) indexed  by i. The random return at the end of period t=2 on
a dollar (at  book value) of loan i is represented  by 6'AR.  We take the
Koehn and Santomero [1988]).5-
nominal  loan  obligation  R as given  in  the  analysis.  In  period  tl1,  sle[O,l]
is  known,  but A Ae[0,1]  is  uncertain.  However,  all  participants  know  A's
density  and  distribution  functions  f(A)  and  F(A).  This  parametrization  is
meant  to  capture  the  notion  that  the  actual  return  on each  loan  depends  on a
market  factor  A as well  as a specific  factor  6%.  6'  can  be interpreted  as the
outcome  of the  realization  of a past  shock.  We normalize  the  total  book  value
of the  assets  of  a representative  bank  to  one,  i.e  Lo  EL'  =  1.  We denote
by p1 the "fair"  value  of  market  risk,  i.e  p1 =  E(AR)/R,  and  by  pii  - bip,  for
all i,  the  fair  value  of loan  i,  where  E(.)  represents  the  expectation
operator  and  R one  plus  the  risk  free  interest  rate.  On the  liability  side,
banks  hold  deposits,  D.  We assume  that  deposits  are insured  at a fixed  cost,
and  that  depositors  earn  the  risk  free  interest  rate,  R.
The  value  of a representative  bank  can  be written  as  a function  of  L
and  D:
Vl(.)  - (I/R)Jf  [Li6iRA  - DR] f(A)dA ;  with ELS;  - DR  (1)
A 1
where  Al  is the  state  of  nature  in  which  the  bank  fails.  When  A < A 1, the
deposit  insurance  agency  repays  the  part  of deposits  the  bank defaults  on.
It  would  be helpful  in the  sequel  to rewrite  the  bank's  value
function  in terms  of the  fair  value  of its  assets  A,  - [EL 1p'].  Let  C 1 =
[EL'pl]  - D - A1 - D. The variable C 1 is often called enterprise-contributed
equity  to differentiate  it from  federally-contributed  equity  (see  Kane (1989)
for  a thorough  discussion).  It  is then  possible  to show  that  (see  appendix  1
3Issues relating  to  optimal  bank  size  arise  with  the  existence  of monopoly
profits  in  some  markets;  see  Atiyas  (1990)  for  an  excellent  treatment.  For
our  purposes  however,  we abstract  from  such  issues  and  analyze  only  the  asset
choice  per  unit  of total  book  value  of assets.
4With  no loss  of generality,  we take  the  insurance  premium  to  be zero.-6-
for  a derivation):
V1 - C 1 + I1 ;  with  (2)
- (1/R) }  [DR  - ELY6RA]  f  ()dA  (3)
0
- (A 1/R) |  ((1  - kl)R  - (AR/pj)]  f(A)dA  (3')
0
(1  - kl)  - D  /  Al  (4)
A 1 - (1  - kj)p 1R/K  (5)
Eq. (2)  expresses  the  value  of a  bank  as  a sum  of the  net fair  value  of its
assets,  C.,  plus  the  value  of the  deposit  insurance  subsidy,  Il.  Il  is
defined  in  equation  (3)  as the  difference  between  the  bank's  obligation  to
deposit-holders,  DR,  and  expected  available  resources  ELY6iAR,  integrated
over  all  states  in  which  the  bank  fails.  Further,  we have  expressed  in  eq.
(3')  I.  in  terms  of the  bank's  real  leverage  1/k 1 defined  in  eq. (4)  (note
that (1/kl)-  Al/Cl).  Eq. (5)  redefines  the  failure  state  A1 in  terms  of the
bank's  leverage.
Deposit  insurance  at fixed  cost  creates  a subsidized  source  ot funds.
Given  their  portfolio  of assets  (Li),  banks  would  gain  by financing  their
assets  by as much  deposits,  and  as little  own  capital  as  possible.  It  can
indeed  be checked  in  eq. (2)  and  (3)  that  the  bank's  value  increafas  with
leverage.  Without  an established  minimum  deposit  to  assets  ratio,  the
leverage  of risk  neutral  banks  would  be unbounded,  as  would  be the  sLbsidy
from  the  taxpayers.
However,  capital  adequacy  requirements  (CAR)  restrict  banks  deposits
to remain  below  some  multiple  (l-k)  of the  book  value  oL  assets.  The  CAP.  can
be written  as:-7-
D 5-  Lo (1  )  (6)
Under  risk  neutrality,  banks  would  choose  to increase  re.-l  leverage  as  much
as possible.  Therefore,  the  bank's  optimal  leverage  is  initially  given  by:
(I  - k1)  - (I  - A)LD,/A,.(7
Real  leverage  (1/k,)  exceeds  (l/k)  whenever  the  value  assets  has  fallen  below
book  value  (i.e,  A1 < Lo).  The larger  the  discrepancy  between  real  and  book
value  of assets,  the  higher  is (1/kl).  Because  leverage  increases  the  deposit
insurance  subsidy,  Il,  and  thus  the  bank's  value,  V1, assets  that  depreciated
after  they  were  booked  therefore  acquire  a special  value  due  to the  "excess
leverage"  rights  they  confer.  The  important  implication  is  that  no bank  would
be willing  to sell  sach  assets  at their  fair  valtue.5  It is  also  important  to
realize  that  those  "excess  leverage"  rigrits  are  not transferable,  since  an
asset  must  be entered  in the  books  at the  price  at which  it is  purchased.
Thus,  a  bank  with  a positive  probability  of failure  values  the  Brazilian  debt
it  holds  on its  books  at  more than  its  fair  value,  yet  it  has  no incentives
to  purchase  Brazilian  debt  from  anothex  bank  at the  fair  price.  However,  this
bank  would  accept  to  sell  its  Brazilian  debt  if the  sale  price  is large
enough  to compensate  not  only  for  the  lost  future  income,  but also  for the
lost  "excess  leverage"  rights.  What  concerns  us here  is to analyze  the
determinants  of that  exit  price.
2.2  Banks  Choice  from  a  Menu of  Options
5Regulations  which  require  that  the  bank  "mark  to  market"  t.ie  remaining  debt
if it  takes  a loss  on  part  of a similar  debt,  which  are  a feature  of the  U.S.
banking  environment,  merely  magnify  the  importance  of capitalization
requirements  based  on  book  value  accounting.-8-
Consider  that  each  of the  creditor  banks  is  now  confronted  with two
options  at the  end  of t-l:  each  dollar  of  country  debt  held  can  be either
rescheduled,  requiring  (forced)  new  lending  in  the  amount  p. or it can  be
sold  at  a price  of  A  > pl. 6,7  When  a unit  of debt  is sold,  the  proceeds  are
used  to  buy  risky  assets  of equivalent  value,  but  the  bank  must  write  down
its  own  capital  by (1  - p).  To  maintain  capital  adequacy,  the  bank  is then
required  to  raise  additional  capital  (1  - p),  or to reduce  deposits  by (1  -
- p). In  our  model,  the  former  policy  is  preferred  (however,  our  results
apply  in  a stronger  form  to the  case  where  the  bank  m;ist  shrink).
Assume  for  simplicity  that  additional  capital  must  be raised  in the
form  of  equity. 8 If  e dollars  of country  debt  are  sold  (e  < Li),  the  value  of
the  bank for  the  initial  shareholders,  V(.),  becomes:
V2(e, p, p)  Cl  + I2(.)  + (p - pl)e - (U  - e)M(l - p 1),  (8)
where:
I2(.)  =  [A 2/R]  2  [(l-k 2(.))R  - (AR/pj)]  f(A)dA  (9)
0
A,(.)  A1 + e(p - p1) - (L 1 - e)p(l - p1) + e(l - p)  (10)
where  A2(e)  and (1 - k2(.))  are  defined  as in eqs.  (4)  and (5)  respectively,
but  with  k1 replaced  by k2(.),  and  Al  by A2(.).  Eq. (8)  says  that  the  value--
to old  shareholders--of  a  bank that  owns  L  units  of debt  and  exits  on e
6In  a  pure  buyback,  p  is set  to zero.  Also,  note  thaL  in general,  the
announcement  of a debt  reduction  will  increase  debt  prices.  With  no loss  of
generality,  it  is  possible  to interpret  p  as the  ex-post  debt  price.  For  an
analysis  of the  equilibrium  debt  price  foilowing  a  menu  driven  debt  deal,  see
Diwan  and  Kletzer  (1990).
7New  lending  requires  the  bank  to sell  other  assets  of value  p, or to raise
new  equity  and  deposits.  In  the  first  case,  the  bank  would  choose  to  dispose
of the  assets  that  can  be sold  at  book  value.  We do  not  pursue  the  second
case  in  order  to  keep size  (in  terms  of  book  values)  constant  in our
analys  is.
Alternatively,  additional  capital  can  be raised  by issuing  subordinated
debt.  The  Modigliani-Miller  theorem  applies  here  and  the  subordinated  debt  to
equity  choice  is thus  undetermined.-9-
units  is given  by the  sum  of: the  value  of its  net  own  capital  C1; the  new
value  of deposit  insurance  I2(.);  the  subsidy  it receives  on exited  delt,  (p
- pl)e;  minus the losses iaLcurred  from relending a fraction  p  of its
remaining exposure, (L 1 - e)p(l - p 1). Eq. (10)  defines the new value of
assets  as the  sum  of:  the  value  of  old  assets;  the  exit  subsidy;  minus  the
loss from relending; plus the assets purchased with the newly raised equity
e(1-p). Note that this last term is not part of V2(.), because the value of
the new assets is equal to the new shareholders'  equity.
Given a menu of options (p,,s),  each bank must decide how to allocate
its country debt Li  between the two options so as to maxim,ze its value V(.).
Differentiating (8),  the marginal effect of exit is given by:
8v  2 /ae  °  aI 2 /8e  +  (P  - P1)  +  A(l  - p1 J  (11)
Exit at p reduces the  bank value on account of a reO%zction  in the insurance
subsidy I2 due to the required reduction in leverage (LLat is, 012/ae S 0).
However, the bank's value increases proportionally  to the exit subsidy (p -
p1). Moreover, p(l - pl)  of relending costs are saved. As apparent, the
marginal  benefits  are  linear  in  the  amount  of  exit  e.  The  marginal  cost  of
exit,  aI 2/ae,  however  depends  on the  amount  of exit.  It is  possible  to show
that  a2I 2/ae 2 > 0 (see  appendix).  The intuition  is  simple:  as a  bank sells  a
unit  of debt,  the  probability  of failure  is reduced,  making  further  exit less
costly.  As a result,  the  optimal  response  to  a menu (p ,p)  is  a corner
solution:  either  a bank  exits  completely,  or it  only  relends.
2.3  Characteristics  of  Exiting  Banks
We are  now In  a position  to  analyze  the  characteristics  of  banks  that
choose  to exit  rather  than  to  relend.  Denote  by  VR  and  VE  the  values  of the-10-
bank  when it  only  relen, (e  0) and  exits  (e  - L1) respectively.  We can
compute  p(y,  k1, LI),  the  smallest  price  at  which  a  bank  with "financial
strength"  k1 and  exposure  Li  is  willing  to  exit.  Formally,  p(.)  solves:
VR  - V(O,  p)  V(L  ,  p, A)  V  (12)
which  reduces  after  some  manipulations  to:
(IR - IE)  L'  [t(l - p 1) +  (p - p 1 )]  (13)
where  I and IE  are  the  values  of deposit  insurance  at e  - 0 and  e - LI
respectively.  Equation  (13)  s.ates  that  p is  the  exit  price  at which  the
total  loss  from  exit (AI)  is  equal  to the  total  benefit  of exit.
(i)  Effect  of financial  strength:  From (13),  it is  easy  to  verify  that  banks
with  a stronger  financial  position  given  exposure,  i.e  larger  losses  on their
balance  sheet  for  a given  exposure  would  exit  at a lower  price  than  weaker
banks.  We show  in  appendix  3 that-
dp/dA 1I L1 ￿  0.  (14)
This result  is  due to  the  fact  that  in the  model  the  marginal  value  of real
leverage  increases  with  the  probability  of failure.  The  stronger  a bank,  the
less  it  values  excess  leverage.
(ii)  Effect  of Exposure  From (13),  it  is also  possible  to  show  that  banks
with  a larger  exposure  to  the  country  would  accept  to  exit  at a lower  price
than  banks  with  a low  exposure,  given  financial  strength,  that  is (see
appendix  3):-11-
ap/aL' I  Al  <  O.  (15)
The intuition  now is the following.  Take two banks with equal.  strength,  but
with bank A more exposed to Brazil than bank B. Both require an equal price
to sell their fist unit of Brazilian debt, and lower prices for subsequent
units (because they are now stronger). But because  A is  more exposed, it
continues to sell Brazil debt at lower  prices when B is already completely
out. As a result, A would be willing to exit completely at a lower average
price than B.
3.  The  Brazil  1988  Refinancing  Pactage
The deal reached between Brazil and its Bank advisory committee in
June 1988 formally terminated the moratorium declared by Brazil in February
1987. The package had three  main components: 9
o The restructuring of $62 billion of outstanding  debt into a single
deposit (MYDFA) facility in Brazil's central  bank and the renewal of trade
and interbank credit lines;
o four new money packages totalling $5.2 billion;' 0
a and an exit option that can be substituted  for new money.
The deal presented the banks with a two-step  decision. (a) First, each bank
had to determine the extent to which it desired to exit. By converting (all
or part of) its exposure to the exit  bond, the  bank would escape the new
money requirement on that part of its exposure. (b)  Second, each bank had to
reschedule its remaining exposure and provide new money loans in proportion
to its remaining exposure. The total new money contribution of each bank had
to be allocated to one of the four available new money facilities.
The size of the required new money contribution  was computed by
For details, see Lamdany 1989.
"A summary of each option characteristics  appears in table 2.-12-
taking  11.4  percent  of  each individual  bank's  remaining  Brazil  exposure,
which  was determined  by its  1987  exposure  minus  the  size  of its  holding  of
the  new  exit  bond.  In case  a  bank  decided  instead  to  exit  cn a certain
portion  of its  outstanding  loans,  it  had to  convert  its  old loans  into  a new
exit  bond.
More than  90%  of the  new  money  was  committed  by August  5, the
deadline  to receive  an early  participation  fee.  In  September,  the  agreement
was  signed  by Brazil's  creditors,  and  in  November,  the  first  tranche  of $4
billion  of the  new-money  loans  were  disbursed.
Predictions  of the  Model
The  exit  bond  offers  a  below  market  interest  (of  6 percent)  and  the
conversion  took  place  at par.  It  was  also  agreed  that  the  exit  bond  could  be
exchanged  on competitive  terms  for  a new  financial  instrument  to  be issued  in
the  future--the  OTN--that  would  be indexed  on the  value  oi the  dollar.  iThe
institutions  that  chose  to exit  and  retain  the  exit  bond  in their  portfolio
did  not  liave  to  write-off  their  capital  directly,  but the  lower  interest
earned  will result  in  future  losses  in  their  income  statements,  lowering
their  book capital  through  the  retained  earnings  account.  Banks  that  expected
to  swap  their  exit  bonds  for  OTNs  would  however  have to  write-off  the
difference  between  the  values  of the  two  instruments.
Our  model  predicts  that  the  relatively  stronger  and  more  exposed
banks  would  be more interested  by the  exit  bond  than  the  relatively  weaker
and  less  exposed  institutions.
Our  model  also  predicts  that  each  bank  would  choose  only  one  option
(corner  solution).  However,  this  last  prediction  cannot  be tested  directly
using  the  Brazil  1988  deal.  The  supply  of the  exit  bond  was restricted  to  a
" 1This  last  part  of the  agreement  has  not  been implemented  however.-13-
maximum  of $5  billion  but only  $1.2  billion  was issued.  This  was  not  however
a reflexion  of a lack  of demand  for  exit  bonds,  but  was  rather  an  unfortunate
consequence  of the  distribution  mechanism  in  place.  The  allocation  of the
options  was achieved  in  two  rounds.  In the  first  round,  banks  indicated  two
dollar  figures  for  each  option:  a  bid (restricted  by some  ceilings),  and  a
reallocation.  Banks  received  the  options  they  bid for,  and the  uncommitted
portion  of each  facility  was then  reoffered  to  banks  that  acquired  this
option  during  the  first  round  and  elected  to  reallocate  all  or part  of their
commitment  to that  option.  Each  bank's  share  of the  remaining  amounts  of each
option  was  then  determined  in  a second  round  by pro-rating  their  reallocation
bids.  However,  the  reallocation  bid  most  banks  choose  turned  out  to  be the
new  money  trade  facility  (which  indeed  ended  up oversubscribed),  because  it
was  rightly  expected  that  this  option  was  more  valuable  than  any  other.  As a
result,  we expect  that  the  weaker  and  more  exposed  banks  chose  to only  relend
while  the  stronger  and  more  exposed  banks  exited  at least  partially.
4. The  Empirical  Model
In this  section,  we attempt  to  assess  empirically  the  characteristics
of exiting  banks  using  data  from  the  Brazil  financing  package.  Table  3
describes  banks'  choices  based  on their  asset  size  and  nationality  (since
breakdown  based  on exposure  is  similar  to that  based  on asset  size,  it  is  not
reported).  Bank  choices  based  on  nationality  do not  seem  to differ
significantly.  Approximately  40 to 50  percent  of the  banks  in each  group
exited  or partially  exited,  while  the  rest  chose  to only  relend.  Differences
are  not  blurred,  however,  when  banks  are  grouped  based  on their  asset  sizes.
Clearly,  smaller  banks  preferred  to exit  whereas  largest  banks  chose  to only
relend.  Nevertheless,  the  choice  behavior  indicated  by table  3  may  be
misleading.  Banks  may  be affected  by other  factors  while  making  their
decisions.  Our  model  predicts  that  strong  banks  will  exit,  and  we are  also-14-
interested in evaluating the importance of such factors as exposure,
nationality, and long-term  business interest.  Numbers in table 3 may not give
us an accurate picture since we do not control for these additional factors.
Our aim is to study all relevant  effects simultaneously to be able control
and separate individual  effects.
To test the implications  of the theoretical model, we need an
empirical model of bank choice behavior. Because banks' decision cannot be
predicted with certainty, we model the choice probabilities. The empirical
model describes the choices among a limited  number of alternatives  by
relating the conditional probability of a particular choice being made to
bank characteristics identified  by our theoretical model.
Consider modelling the choice behavior of banks when two alternatives
are available (exit  partially  vs. relend only) and one must be chosen 12. The
decision by the ith bank can be conveniently  represented by a random variable
Di that takes the value one if the  bank chooses to only relend and the value
zero if the bank partially exits. Let Pi represents the probability that Di
takes the value one. It is of interest to estimate the probabilities Pi  as
well as how various explanatory  variables affect Pi.
As in the case of the theoretical formulation, the individual  bank
makes the decision that  maximizes the expected value of its equity. Assume
the expected equity value of the institution (Vi)  differs under each choice
due to banks' individual  characteristics and a random disturbance. Then,
assuming linearity,
Vio  =  ai 0Ci  + eio, and  (16)
Vil  8  ai 1C,  +  eilX
12Note  that this analysis can be easily extended to j>2 alternatives in a
financing package.  See Judge et al., 1985, ch. 18.-15-
where  Ci  is the  vector  of  characteristics  of the  ith  bank,  and  eio  and  eil  are
random  disturbances.  Thus  Di  - 1 if  Vil  >  VLO  and  Di  0  O otherwise.  Then,
P(Di  - 1)  - P (Vil  > Vi0)  (17)
- P  [(eio  - eil)  <  [ailCi  - aiOCi1  - F(xi),
where  xi - (ail  - ai0)Ci  and  F  is  the  cumulative  distribution  function  of  (eio
- eil).  Therefore,  Pi 3, the  probability  that  the  ith  bank  will  make  the  jth
choice  will  be a function  of  Ci.
Following  equation  (17),  the  empirical  model  is:
P(Di-l)  - f(MV/A,  BV/A,  PCLLR,  LLR/BV,  EX/BV,  DUS,  DEUROPE)  +  e  (18)
The  model  estimated  relates  the  conditional  probability  of  making  a choice  to
bank  characteristic  proxies  explained  below  and  listed  in  table  4.
4.1  Choice  of Proxy  Variables
The theoretical  model  explained  in  section  2 identifies  the  financial
strength--more  precisely,  real  leverage  k,  - (Cl/Al)--of  the  institution  as a
crucial  determinant  of its  choice.  However  it is  not  easy  to  capture  this
variable.  We use  two  direct  proxies  for  real  leverage,  the  book  value (BV)
and  the  market  value  (MV)  of the  institutions'  capital,  deflated  by the  total
book  value  of  their  assets  (A).  Neither  variable  is an  accurate  estimate  of
real  leverage:  entreprise-contributed  equity  of  bank  are  not  known;  BV of
equity  is likely  to  have  a  positive  bias since  managers  of weak  financial
institutions  have incentives  to  overstate  their  capital;  NV of equity,  as
given  by the  value  of  outstanding  stock  of the  institution,  has  a  negative
bias  because  it  captures  the  value  of  deposit  insurance  guarantees  in-16-
addition  to the  fair  value  of the  institutions'  own  capital.  13
We use  two  indirect  measures  of financial  strength  to correct  for
biases  introduced  by the  use of  market  and  book  values  of assets.  The loan
loss  reserves  (LLR)  to  BV ratio  is  used  as a  measure  of  how deceptive  the
book  value  of assets  for  institutions  that  are  allowed  to include  loan  loss
reserves  in their  capital,  since  including  anticipated  losses  in
institutions'  book  value  overestimates  their  equity.  The  percentage  change  in
LLR is  used  to  measure  how  deceptive  market  values  are.  Market  values  can  be
relatively  high  for  weak institutions  because  they  partly  capture  federal-
contributed  equity.  As discussed  in  the  next  section,  the  percentage  change
in  LLR  can  be taken  as  a direct  signal  of  a bank's  portfolio  quality  in the
U.S  and in  Japan.  However  (se  below),  due  to  national  differences  surrounding
the  costs  and  benefits  of  provisioning  decisions,  we do not  expect  those
variables  to affect  banks'  menu  choices  in  the  other  OECD  countries.
Exposure  is  another  factor  identified  by our  model  as a determinant
of  bank choices.  Holding  financial  strength  constant,  our  model  predicts  that
more  exposed  banks  exit  more.  On the  other  hand,  other  models,  as  well  as
intuitive  statements  often  predict  the  opposite,  i.e,  that  more  exposed  banks
are  more likely  to relend.  Thus,  the  institutions'  exposure  to Brazil  (EX),
and  to  other  developing  countries  (TEX)  are included  to  test  the  direction
and  significance  of this  effect.
The  decision  of two  banks  with identical  strengths  and  exposures  may
also  differ  due  to differences  in the  regulatory,  fiscal  and  accounting
system  in the  countries  in  which  they  operate  (see  4.2).  To study  national
differences  in  general,  dummy  variables  are  used (DUS,  DEUROPE  and  others).
Finally,  we want  to test  the  widely  held  hypotheses  that  large
13The variable  C1 used  in  our  model  (often  called  enterprise-contributed
equity)is  the  market  value  of an institution's  equity  net  of its  federal
insurance  guaranmees.  See  Kane (1989)  for  a thorough  discussion.-17-
institutions,  and institutions  with  long-term  business  interests  in the
country  prefer  to  relend  rather  than  exit.  The  empirical  model  also  includes
proxies  to capture  these  effects.  As size  proxies,  total  assets  (A)  and  total
liabilities  (L)  are  used.  To proxy  long  term  business  interests  of
institutions,  dummy  variables  indicating  banks'  number  of branches  in the
country  are included.
4.2  A  Parenthesis on Provisioning  Policy
In the  model  developed  above,  we considered  that  it is  when an asset
is sold  for  less  than  its  book  value  that  regulatory  costs  are  imposed.
Moreover,  we ignored  the  existence  of tax  benefits  associated  with  losses.
Thus,  we did  not  analyze  banks'  incentives  to  recognize  losses  without
actually  disposing  of assets.  But  in  reality,  banks  can  recognize  losses
through  provisioning  rather  than  solely  through  market  sales.  In  some
countries  (the  U.K,  Switzerland,  Canada,  France  and  Germany),  tax  benefits
accrue  when losses  are  recognized  through  provisioning.  But in the  US and
Japan,  tax  benefits  only  accrue  as a result  of  exchanges  and  buybacks,  and
there  are  no tax  benefits  to  provisioning.  On the  cost  side,  provisioning  is
devoid  of regulatory  costs  in  some  of the  creditors  countries:  the  US, France
and  Japan  allow  commercial  banks  to include  loan-loss  provisions  (LLR)  in
capital.  However,  most  other  OECD  countries  do  not  consider  LLR to  be part  of
the  bank's  capital,  making  provisioning  costly  in  regulatory  terms.  The  Basle
agreement--which  will take  full  force  in 1992--calls  however  for  the
exclusion  of LLR  from  capital  in  all  OECD  countries.
Let  us now  compare  exit  against  provisioning.
(1)  In France,  provisioning  offers  tax  advantages  but  no regulatory  costs.
Thus,  all  banks  should  provision  as  much  as allowed  with  timing  depending  on
tax  shelter  considerations  only.  Once  provisions  are  in place,  exit  offers  no-18-
tax  advantage,  but it  is costly  in  regulatory  terms.
(2)  In Canada,  Switzerland,  Germany  and  the  U.K,  provisioning  and  exiting
offer  the  same .ax  advantages  and  regulatory  costs.  As a result,  provisioning
allows  banks  to exit  partially  and  at their  preferred  speed.  Once  provisions
are  built,  exit  may allow  for  additional  tax  benefit  and  regulatory  cost,
depending  on the  size  of the  provisions.1 4
(3)  In the  US and  Japan,  provisioning  was  devoid  of any  important  regulatory
costs  and  tax  benefits  at the  time  the  deal  was  finalized.  5 However,  the
Basle  agreements  reached  in 1987  specify  that  starting  in 1992,  provisions
will  be excluded  from  capital.  As a rasult,  existing  provisions  will  become
costly  in 1992.  By then,  banks  that  have  built  LLR  will  have to  raise  capital
or reduce  assets.  Thus,  starting  in 1987,  reserving  must  have  been  perceived
as costly,  especially  as  no tax  benefits  were  available.  However,  increases
in  provisions  became  a popular  bank strategy  since  May 1987,  when  Citicorp
increased  its  provisions  by $  3  billion.  The  market  reacted  with  an 8  percent
rise  in its  stock  price.  More generally,  event  studies  show  that  banks  that
increased  their  LLR  experienced  a rise  in  stock  prices,  while  those  that  did
not lost  value [Grammatikos  and  Sanders  (1988),  Musumeci  and  Sinkey  (1990)].
It is  then  tempting  to  interpret  provisioning  policy  as  a tool  banks  have
been  using  to  signal  the  true  quality  of their  assets  (that  is,  C,)  to the
market-place.  Since  raising  capital  will  be less  costly  to  banks  that  will  be
perceived  as strong  in  1992,  building  provisions  must  be perceived  as less
costly  by the  insiders  of those  banks.  The  signalling  hypothesis  is that
stronger  banks (from  the  U.S  and  Japan,  but  not from  other  OECD  countries
14However,  in  case  of over-provisioning,  the  bank  may  have to  pay taxes  on
the  gains  that  arise  from  the  sale,  and  this  discourages  exit.  This  seems  to
be the  case for  several  German  banks.
15For  Japanese  banks  capital  inclusion  of reserves  is  allowed  up to  14
percent  and  tax  deductibility  for  only  one  percent. U.S.  and  Japanese  banks
have 50  percent  and  15  percent  reserve  levels  respectively.-19-
where  provisioning  policy  is  driven  by tax  considerations)  have  used
provisioning  policy  as a  means  to signal  the  true  value  of their  current
portfolio  and  reduce  their  current  cost  of funds. 16
Another  aspect  of commercial  bank  regulations  that  affects  the  choice
between  new  money  and  exit  instruments  is  the  mandated  provisioning  rules  for
bad loans.  When  such  provisions  are  required,  relending  becomes  taxed
relative  to  exiting  and  therefore  becomes  less  attractive.  This is  especially
true  in  Canada,  Switzerland  and  in the  U.K.
4.3  Estimation  Technique  and  the  Data  Set
Estimation  of this  model  is  possible  using  a qualitative  response
model.  The type  of the  model  obtained  depends  on the  choice  of F in  equation
(13).  Most  common  choices  in  economic  applications  are  linear,  normal,  and
logistic  functions  which  lead  respectively  to  linear,  probit,  and  logit
17 probability  models.  Here,  Logit  Maximum  Likelihood  Method  is  used
To analyze  banks'  choice  behavior,  the  partizipants  in  the  Brazil
financing  package  are  categ -ized  into  two  classes  based  on their  choices:
1.  no exit,  2. exit (partial  or complete).  Dependent  variable  is assigned  the
value  zero  for  exit  and  value  one  for  no exit  choices.
Before  the  estimations,  candidate  proxy  variables  are  checked  for
possible  multicollinearity,  using  Belsley,  Kuh,  and  Welsch  (1980)  two  step
procedure.  This  procedure  combines  two  diagnostic  tools  to dete~t  which
coefficients  are  most likely  to  be affected  by the  collinearity.  The first
statistic  is  the  condition  number  of the  X matrix  (regressor  matrix)  which  is
16However,  the  argument  above  does  not imply  that  banks  that  increased  their
LLR  to  signal  strength  have  ended  up  with  a larger  ratio  of LLR  relative  to
assets.  In fact,  in  our  sample,  those  banks'  LLR  to  assets  ratios  have
remained  relatively  constant,  indicating  that  banks  that  have increased
provisions  have  also tended  to  raise  new  equity.
The  alternative  models  and  their  underlying  assumptions  are  discussed  in
detail  in  Judge  et al. (1985)  and  Amemiya  (1981).-20-
defined  as the  ratio  of the  square  roots  of the  minimum  and  maximum
eigenvalues  of X'X  matrix.  The  condition  number  is  unity  when the  columns  of
X are  orthogonal  and  rises  above  unity  with  collinearity  between  columns.  The
second  diagnostic  tool  is  the  regression  coefficient  variance  decompositior.,
which  is  used to  compute  the  proportions  of coefficient  variances  associated
with  each  eigenvalue.  In the  first  step  the  eigenvalues  that  signal
multicollinearity  are  identified.  The  second  step  inspects  the  proportions  of
the  sampling  variance  of  each  coefficient  associated  with  those  eigenvalues
and  detects  the  regressors  that  are  causing  the  X'X  matrix  to  be ill-
conditioned.  18
The  multicollinearity  test  indicates  that  only  two  variables  are
dangerously  correlated:  Market  and  book  values  of equity.  Therefore,  they  are
used  alternatively  in regressions.  Different  specifications  are  compared
based  on three  criteria  recommended  by  Amemiya  (1981).  These  are  model  chi-
square,  Akaike's  information  criterion  (AIC),  and  in-sample  classification
accuracy.  (i)  Model  chi-square  is  the  outcome  of a likelihood-ratio  test  of
the  joint  significance  of  all  variables  in the  model.  It is  measured  as twice
the  difference  in  log  likelihood  of the  current  model  from  the  likelihood
only  based  on the intercept.  The  null  hypothesis  that  all  the  explanatory
variables  in the  model  are  zero  is  rejected  if  the  calculated  chi-square
statistic  is  grater  than  a critical  value.  (ii)  Akaike's  (1973)  information
criterion  (AIC)  is  desirable  in  comparing  models  with different  degrees  of
freedom  since  it  makes  an adjustment  to  penalize  for  the  number  of parameters
estimated.  It is  given  by the  negative  log  likelihood  of the  model  plus the
number  of estimated  parameters.  We seek  the  model  for  which  AIC is the
smallest.  (iii)  In-sample  prediction  accuracy  indicates  the  overall
classification  accuracy  of the  model.  It is  given  by the  total  percentage  of
18See Belsley,  Kuh,  and  Welsch  (1980)  for  further  details  of the  technique.-21-
correctly  classified  observations  and  is a  determinant  of statistical  fit
(Maddala,  1986).
Final  model  specifications,  determined  based  on the  above  criteria,
are  further  tested  using  Davidson  and  MacKinnon  (1984)  specification  test  for
logit  and  probit  models.  This  is a general  specification  test  that  is capable
of detecting  various  forms  of model  inadequacy  such  as omitted  variables,
structural  shifts  in  coefficients,  and  heteroskedasticity.  The  Lagrange
multiplier  test  statistic  is  given  by the  explained  sum  of squares  from  an
artificial  linear  regression  in  which  a vector  of  ones is  regressed  on a
constructed  vector  of  variables19
Data
The  banks  that  participated  in the  1988  Brazilian  financing  package
are  classified  into  three  groups:  U.S.,  Japanese,  and  European  (including
Australia  and  Canada)  banks.  All  banks  refer  to  the  consolidated  banks,  i.e.,
bank  holding  companies.  Bank  data  are  obtained  from  Moody's  Bank  Manual,
Nihon  Keizai  Shimbun  Bank  Annual  Tapes,  and  IBCA  for  U.S.,  Japanese,  and
European  banks  respectively.  Stock  price  information  is  obtained  from  Wall
Street  Journal  for  U.S.  banks,  from  Nihon  Keizai  Shimbun  for  Japanese  banks,
and  from  Financial  Times  for  European  banks.  When  explanatory  variables  are
not  in terms  of percentages,  they  are  converted  to  US$  using  exchange  rate
information  obtained  from  Financial  Times.  Definitions  are  given  in table  4.
For  each  institution,  where  possible,  two-year  (1986,  1987)  year-end
annual  time  series  data  are  collected.  Each  bank's  Brazilian  exposure  and
participation  in the  financing  package  are  given  in  Gazeta  Mercantil,  March
26,  1989.  In the  resulting  data  set  approximately  70  percent  of the  deal is
represented.  The  Japanese  and  US  bank  data  sets  are  more  complete  and
19The  equations  used  to construct  the  artificial  variables and  description
of the  test  in detail  are  given  in  Davidson  and  Mackinnon  (1984).-22-
representative  than  that  of the  European  banks.
4.4  Istimtion  Results
The  results  are  reported  in table  5.  The  two  samples  used  are  the
U.S.  and  Japanese  banks  and  all  banks.  The  U.S.  and  Japanese  banks  are  first
analyzed  separately  since  their  data  set  is  more  complete  and  homogeneous.
The  first  column  in table  5  reports  results  for  U.S.  and  Japanese  banks.
These  two  groups  of  banks  do not  significantly  differ  in  their  choice
behavior.  This  is  evidenced  by the  insignificant  coefficient  of the
nationality  dummy  variable,  DUS.  Although  not  reported,  dummy  variables  for
slope  coefficients  do not  prove  significant  either.
All the  proxies  for  financial  strength  develop  significant
coefficients  with the  expected  sign,  indicating  that  the  weaker  institutions
are  less  likely  to exit.  In  particular,  we find  that  banks  with  higher  MV to
assets  ratios  and  with  higher  increases  in  LLR  tend  to  exit  more,  and that
banks  with  higher  LLR  to asset  ratios  tend  to  exit  less. 20 These  results
strongly  confirms  the  main  prediction  of  the  theoretical  model.
The  exposure  to Brazil  debt  to  book  value  ratio  produces  a negative
and  significant  coefficient,  thus  confirming  another  result  of  our  model.
Controlling  for  financial  strength,  the  greater  the  exposure  of the
institution,  the  less  likely  it is  to only  relend. 
21
The  affiliate  and  branch  dummy  variables  and  asset  size  variable  all
produce  positive  yet insignificant  coefficients.  The  positive  sign for
affiliate  and  branch  dummy  variables  are  expected  since  they  are included  to
capture,  at least  partially,  the  value  of banking  assets  of the  institutions
20Both  KV and  BV coefficients  capture  this  effect,  however  the  specification
including  BV is  not reported  since  it is  significantly  inferior  based  on our
criteria.
21Due  to incomplete  information,  the  variable  TEX  turns  out  to  be
insignificant.-23-
in  Brazil.  When this  value  is larger,  banks  are  expected  to relend  rather
than  exit.  The  positive  signs  are  consistent  with this  argument,  yet their
insignificance  indicdtes  that  the  dummy  variables  do not  capture  all the
information,  and  we lack  better  proxies.
Asset  size  coefficient's  positive  sign  indicates  that  larger
institutions  are  more likely  to  relend.  However  since  it is  insignificant,  we
can  conclude  that  controlling  for  other  characteristics,  size  is  not  an
important  determinant.  As indicated  by table  3, large  institutions  appear  to
relend  rather  than  exit.  Yet this  effect  is  not  statistically  significant  in
the  Brazil  deal,  once  we control  for  other  characteristics.  The  widely  held
belief  that  it is  the  large--rather  than  the  weak--institutions  that  relend
may  be simply  due  to the  fact  that  in  the  U.S,  large  banks  tend  to  be weak.
However,  the inclusion  of other  types  of  banks  in the  sample--and  in
particular  of  many small  and  weak  banks--indicate  that  size  per se  has  not
been an important  determinant  of  exit  behavior.
The  last  two  columns  of table  5 report  results  for  all  banks.  The
most important  difference  is  indicated  by the  European  bank  dummy  variable,
DEUROPE.  Its  negative  and  significant  sign  underlines  the  differences  in
choice  behavior  of European  banks.  As argued  above  (section  5.2),  European
banks (excluding  the  French)  are  expected  to  be willing  to exit  at lower
prices  since  they  tend  to  have  higher  provisions  already  in  place.
Decomposing  the  dummy  variable  to investigate  whether  any  of the
regressors  affect  European  banks  differently  leads  to  interesting  results.  As
reported  in  the  last  column,  dummy  variables  for  percentage  increase  in loan
loss  reserves  and  loan  loss  reserve  to  book  value  ratio  (DPCLLR,  DLLR/BV)
prove  significant  but  have  the  opposite  signs  of the  benchmark  coefficients.
Thus,  as expected,  PCLLR  and  LLR/BV  variables  affect  the  decisionmaking  of US
and  Japanese  banks,  but  not  of  European  banks.  The  rest  of the  regressors-24-
still  have the  same  effects.
The  overall  statistical  fit  of the  model  is  given  by the  criteria
reported  at the  foot  of table  5.  The  joint  insignificance  of independant
variables  is  rejected  at the  one  percent  significance  level  for  alternative
spec7fications  and  the  model  classifies  up to  83 percent  of  bank choices
correctly.  The  null  hypothesis  of no  misspecification  cannot  be rejected  at
the  five  percent  significance  level  for  any  of the  reported  specifications.
5. Conclusions
This  study  provides  evidence  that  bank  characteristics  are
significant  determinants  of commercial-bank  choice  behavior  when  confronted
with  a menu  of options.  We develop  a theoretical  model  of bank  choice
behavior  and  empirically  test  its  implications  using  data  from  the  1988
Brazilian  financing  package.  Our  empirical  results  show  that  bank
characteristics  are  capable  of explaining  over  80 percent  of this  choice.
One of the  main  implications  of the  theoretical  model  is that  under
risk-neutrality  assl-mption,  financially  stronger  and  more  exposed  banks
prefer  to  exit.  These  results  are  also  supported  empirically.  Farthermore,
contrary  to common  belief,  we find  that  bank size  per  se does  not
significantly  affect  exit  behavior.
Our  finding  have  several  important  implications  for  the  new  debt
reduction  strategy.  (i)  First,  larger  debt  reductions  operated  on a  market
basis  are  more  costly,  per  unit  of debt  reduced.  In order  to increase  debt
reduction,  weaker  banks  must  be convinced  to  exit,  increasing  the  needed  exit
price.  (ii)  Second,  the  exit  price  depends  on the  strength  of the  banking
industry,  and  thus,  the  effectiveness  (and  cost)  of the  present  debt  strategy
is  affected  by changes  in the  world  economy.  In perods  of  booms,  banks  become
stronger  and  exit  prices  are  reduced.  (iii)  Third,  regulators  can  affect  the
cost  of  debt  reduction  by altering  the  regulatory  framework  within  which  the-25-
banks operate. (iv) Forth, LDC debt reductions is  beneficial to the deposit
insurance agencies of the major creditor nations.
Our results have important implications  for the analysis of the
secondary market for LDC debt. One implication  of our model is that due to
differences in valuations between (insured)  buyers and sellers of debt, the
volume of debt in "circulation"  must be small. Indeed, traded volumes in LDC
debt have been extremely low--especially  after correcting for demand by the
debtor country-but increasing overtime.  At the same time, LDC debt prices
have declined overtime and especially after 1986, with the magnitude of
decline unexplainable by increasing debt or worsening fundamentals alone. The
model developed above can explain those stylized  facts. Due principally to
subsidized debt to equity swap programs, buyers have been willing to pay more
than the fair price to acquire country debt.  22  Given their reservation price
all banks above a certain strength sold their exposure, while weaker banks
held onto their claims.23  Thus, the observed  market price must be interpreted
as the value of debt to the marginal bank. Furthermore, the supply of debt--
and thus trade  volumes--must have gone up, and debt price down, as the
banking industry regained strength after the big slump of 1982. Finally, it
should be recognized that the debt of similar countries cani  trade at very
different prices if one of the countries engaged in subsidized  debt reduction
programs  while the other did not.
Finally, our results shed new light on the present debt strategy.
Under the old strategy, the IFIs required the commercial banks to share in
the cost of attempting to reform the debtor countries  economies by sharing in
the supply of new loans. However, as banks' financial  situations started to
22Indeed, there is evidence showing that the existence  of debt/equity swap
.rograms  increase debt prices (Salomon:20  percent,  Acharya Diwan:16 percent)
3James (1990) finds direct empirical  evidence that  LDC loans held by the
core lenders exceeds their secondary market prices.-26-
diverge  in  the  mid-eighties,  the  concerted  new  money  approach  broke  down.
Strong  banks  now  resisted  large  new  money  calls.  By 1988,  after  the
completion  of the  Brazil  deal,  new  commercial  credits  litteraly  dried  up.  The
Brady  initiative  should  then  be seen  as  an attempt  to  reduce  the  tensions
within  the  creditor  grc.up  by tailoring  financial  instruments  to the  specific
needs  of banks,  in  particular,  to  allow  strong  banks  to exit  and  weaker
institutions  to relend.  By  negotiating  on a menu  ex  ante  and  allowing  banks
to choose  ex  post the  options  that  they  value  most,  a better  burden  sharing
between  the  IFIs  and the  commercial  banks  can  be achieved  without
unsurmountable  coordination  problems.
Important  tasks  for  future  reseach  are  to  extend  the  analysis  of menu
choices  to  an equilibrium  framework,  to study  the  role  of more  complex
options  such  as exit  and  par  bonds,  and  to  empirically  examine  banks'  choices
in  more  recent  debt  deals  such  as the  Mexican  deal  of 1990.-27-
Appendix of Proofs
1. The value of the insured  bank is given by:
VI-  J  [(LRA)/R  - D] f(A)dA ;  with LRAI  =  DR  (Al)
A
The uninsured bank must borrow from depositors at a rate Ru given  by:
Au
DR - [DRU  [l-F(AU)]  +  J  [LRA ]f(A)dA,  with LRAU  =  DRU.  (A2)
0
Its  value is given by:
1  1
V-  J[(LA)/R  - (DRU/R)]  f(A)dA e  [(LRA)/R]  f(A)dA - tDRU/R)[l-F(Au)]
Au  Au
1  Au
I  [(LIA)/R]f(A)dA  +  E  [(LRA)/R]f(A)dA  - D  using (A2)  (A3)
AUf  0 
- L  E(AR/R) - D  Lp 0 - D  (A3')
where we define p0 = E(AK/R), with E the expectation operator, po the "fair"
price of the loan L, and Lpo,  the initial "fair"  value of loans L.
Subtracting VU from VI  using (Al)  and (A3'),  we get the value of the
insurance subsidy I:
1  1
I 8  VI  - Vu  e  J[(LRA/R)-  D]f(A)dA - 5  [(LRA/R) -D]f(A)dA
Aif  0
f A'  - (LRA/R)]f(A)dA
0
2. Differentiating equation (9)  with respect to e, we have:
OI(.)/ae  =  (aA 2/ae)(I/A 2) +  A2(a(1-k 2/ae)F 2, where F2 =  F(A 2),  (A4)
Furthermore,  using eqs. (10), (4), (5) and (6),  we can compute:
aA2/ae =  (1 - pl)(l  +  i)  >  0  (A5)-28-
a (l-k 2 )/ae  -(1  - k2)(BA 2/8e)/A 2 <  0  (A6)
0A2/ae - (R/R)(a(l-k 2)/ae) <  0  (A7)
8A 2/8(l-k 2) =  R/R >  0  (A8)
Feeding (A5) to (A8) into (A4)  and reducing, we get:
aI(.)/ae  G  - (8A 2/Ae)  J  [RA/R]f(A)dA  s  0  (A9)
0
differentiating (A9), and using (A7)  and (A8),  we get:
a2I(.)/el  -e  (aA 2/ae)(aX 2/8e)A 2R >  o
a2I(.)/8ea(l-k 2)  =  - (aA 2/ae)(A 2/a(l-k 2)A 2R <  0  (Al0)
3. Rewrite eq. (13) as:
G(p,  Al' L1)  _  (IN -IE)  - L' [14(l  - pl) +  (p  - pl)] = 
Using the implicit function theorem, we get:
ap/laA 1 Ll  =  - [aG(.)/aA  I/I[G  a(  .) /ap)  I
ap/aL'  I  A1 =  - [aG(.)/8Ll]/[8G(.)/ap)]
Computing the needed partial derivatives:
aG(.)/aE  °  - <  0,
aG(.)/aA 1 =  [aIN/aAl  - aIE/aAl]  <  0  using  (AlO)
8G(.)/aL'  =  - (p(l - pl) +  (R - p1)] <  0,
we get the results of eqs. (14)  and (15) in the text.-29-
Table 2
Characteristics  of the various menu items
Item  Tocal  Rate  Tenure  Grace  Debt to  Relending  Bearer
amount  (years) (years)  Equity
Rescheduling
MYDFA  62,000  13/16  20  7  auction  X
Interbank  4,600  5.8  up to 1  na  to trade  na
Trade  10,200  5.8  up to 1  na  to interbank  na
New money  5,200
New money bonds 1 674  13/16  12  5  auction  X
Cofinancing  750  13/16  12  5  auction
New trade2  600  13/16  9  9
Parallel  3,176  13/16  12  5  at par  X
Exit  1,200
Exit bonds  1,200  6 fixed  25  10  auction 3 X
Notes: 1. also exempt from Brazilian taxes
2. bullet maturity
3. can also be converted into a dollar indexed  bond that  would be
traded in the Brazilian capital market.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --30-
Table 3
Bank Choices Based on Nationalitv and Size
I. Nationality
only exit  exit and relend  only relend
US  7%  40%  53%
JAP  17%  21%  61%
EUROPE  16%  19%  65%
II.  Asset Size
only exit  exit and relend  only relend
top 10  0/10  3/10  7/10
top 20  1/20  10/20  9/20
smallest 20  13/20  0/20  7/20
smallest 10  7/10  0/10  3/10
Source: Complete data on the 1988  Brazilian Financing  package from the
newspaper Gazeta Mercantil.-31-
Table 4
Variable Definitions and Sources
MV:  market value of the institution's  equity.  MV is the price per share
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.
BV:  book value of the institution's  equity. BV is the book value of assets
minus the book value of liabilities and is given by the sum of capital
stock, surplus, undivided profits and reserves.
A:  total asset size of the institution.
L:  total liability size of the institution.
LLR: loan loss reserves of the institution.
PCLLR:percentage change in loan loss reserves.
EX:  1987 Brazilian exposure of the institutions.  It is calculated from:
EX- (ol+o2+o3+o4)/.114  +oe
where ol-o4 are the new money options and oe is the exit option as given
in Gazeta Mercantil (Economia),  March 26,1989.
TEX: institution's total exposure to all LDCs.
DA, DB: dummy variables for the institution's  affiliates or branches in
Brazil. They take the value zero or the number of existing branches or
affiliates.
Other Dummy Variables:  country or region  dummy variables (e.g., DUS, DJAP,
DEUROPE, denoting U.S., Japanese, and European banks), and above
variables multiplied by country dummies are also included.
Notes: US bank data are obtained from  Moody's Bank Manual. Japanese bank data
are from Nihon Keizai Shimbun Bank Annual Tapes. Data for the rest of the
banks came from IBCA.-32-
Table 5-j  Logit Analysis of Bank Choice Behavior
Dependent variable: bank choice
independent  US & JAPAN  ALL
variables  (1)  (2)  (3)
cons  -4.52**  -2.56*  -3.08*





MV/A  -2.5*  -1.63**  -1.73**
(1.08)  (0.62)  (0.67)
PCLLR  -7.55**  -3.79*  -4.60**
(2.64)  (1.17)  (1.39)
LLR/BV  7.47**  4.07*  6.50**
(3.00)  (1.81)  (2.45)
EX/BV  -7.02*  -4.50Q  -6.65*






Number of obs.  50  72  72
Model  26.38**  22.25**  30.69**
Chi-square
AIC  27.3  42.8  41.1
Total correct  78%  71%  83%
Notes: Standard errors are given in  parantheses.
Dependent variable is assigned value 1 for  banks that only relend (no
exit), and value 0 otherwise (partial  or complete exit).  Independent
variable definitions and sources are given in table 4.
**,  *,  #  indicate coefficient  estimates that differ significantly from
zero at 1, 5, and 10 percents respectively.-33-
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